Secciones
Referencias
Resumen
Servicios
Buscar
Fuente


Planification and development in Venezuela
Planificación y desarrollo en Venezuela
Ius Comitiãlis, vol. 8, núm. 15, pp. 101-123, 2025
Universidad Autónoma del Estado de México

Artículos de investigación


Recepción: 17 Septiembre 2024

Aprobación: 25 Abril 2025

Abstract: This research aims to develop the connecting idea between Planning, Economics, and Development in Venezuela 1961-2024, through a constitutional dogmatic methodology that represents the authentic reality of Venezuela's current situation, but primarily through the vision of critical revisionism of the constitutional and administrative aspects of the Plans, and accountable governance with detailed and critical documentary research that exposes the substantive nature of the Development Plans. While it is true that the Plan's concept also implies economic development, the first plans addressed this idea purely from the perspective of governance. However, governance also means economics, though not entirely. On the one hand, beginning in the 1990s, the Plans overlapped with economics, although not comprehensively, but rather more sector-specific. On the other hand, the ideas of Planning and Economic Development eventually became entirely aligned with economics in the 2013-2019 and 2019-2025 periods, with the Patria Plan and the humanitarian crisis. But the Patria Plan was neither realistic nor aligned with the principles of certainty, efficiency, and effectiveness; the Plan was very short-sighted, aiming only to achieve the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals.

Keywords: Planning, development, economy, humanitarian crisis, constitutional law.

Resumen: Esta investigación pretende desarrollar la idea conectiva entre la Planificación, la Economía y el Desarrollo en Venezuela 1961-2024, a través de una metodología dogmática constitucional que represente la auténtica realidad de la situación actual de Venezuela, pero principalmente por la visión del revisionismo crítico del aspecto constitucional y administrativo de los Planes y la accountable governance con una investigación documental, pormenorizada y crítica, que exponga la sustantividad de los Planes de Desarrollo. Si bien es cierto que la idea del Plan implica también la idea del desarrollo económico, los primeros planes tocaban esa idea desde la mera idea de la gobernanza. No obstante, gobernanza significa también economía, aunque no del todo. Por un lado, a partir de los 90, los Planes tuvieron coincidencia con lo económico, aunque no de manera integral, sino más sectorial. Por otro lado, la idea de la Planificación y el Desarrollo Económico acabaron siendo enteramente coincidentes con la economía en el periodo 2013-2019 y 2019-2025 con el Plan Patria y la crisis humanitaria. Pero el Plan Patria no fue realista, ni ajustado al principio de certeza, eficiencia y eficacia, fue muy cortoplacista, solo para conseguir los objetivos de desarrollo sostenible del 2030.

Palabras clave: Planificación, desarrollo, economía, crisis humanitaria, derecho constitucional.

INTRODUCTION

The subject of Planning and Development is not a topic of great popularity among lawyers. However, it is still a subject of great interest for a limited group of jurists, not to mention that it is a subject of paramount importance for society, since the figure of planning constitutes a rationalizing sum of different concepts derived from different scientific disciplines of the social world. It is a complex world where the world of law, political science, economics and other complementary and related disciplines converge towards the same direction. It is a broad, global, precise and meticulous technique that (with many difficulties to formulate in a few precise and accurate linguistic statements, the objectives and methods necessary to articulate them in the idea of development of a Nation) encloses the state and private actions simultaneously. It can even take root in the idea of a Plan of general procedures which, without the vital legal and mandatory precision of those indicated imperatively in the laws, contribute to expressly orient the central idea aligning the actions of the different public powers constituted in the creation of the objectives, but which can have the same binding or mandatory character.

In the world of planning and development - words that go together legally and in the field of facts - there is a plan for everything and for each specific state sphere. And each with a very different degree of complexity. However, the complexity is greater with the National Economic and Social Development Plan (PDESN, for its initials in Spanish), since it is the macro plan of national life and has definite repercussions in every area of the nation's life. Although it is true that there are many types of Plans, only the PDESN will be discussed, in terms of its links with the State and the Administration, with the Economy, since the planning guidelines order the State-administrative procedure in the economic sphere. Moreover, since the 1990s, administrative development plans have included economic development[1], since the previous juridical-administrative concept was based on the participatory level of the State in an almost monopolistic manner. Hence, it is necessary to address, in a brief way, given the long planning path of the State in the matter of the Plans of the 90's that have touched the structural aspect of the State with the economic field, up to the Patria Plan (Homeland Plan) (2019-2025).

The difficult goal will be reduced to a syncretic exposition of the subject of Planning and Development in Venezuela with its common point in the economic field. It is not going to be an exhaustive exposition, but totally enunciative of the details of Planning and Development in Venezuela for expository and informative purposes, because, although the constitutional regime of economic planning was built around the idea of the republican-representative political form (1958-1999), since 1999 the bias of the same political form changed to republican with direct participation of the popular sectors related to the government of the moment under the auspices of a populist system that led to an authoritarian form of government during the last 26 years, using techniques of control and political hijacking of the institutions to legitimize such National Economic Plans that do not have the legitimacy or acceptance of the majorities.

The Venezuelan economic constitutional system allows the creation of government techniques that admit the necessary viability of state interventionism in economic affairs by means of rules, principles and legal values. However, this is why it is important to review the legality of the Patria Plans at the constitutional level, even at the level of the political majorities as required by the same national constitutional system according to article 187.8 of the Constitution, as an exclusive-excluding competence of the National Assembly to concentrate the national debate around the idea of the convenience and acceptance of the National Plans as to the economic and the channeling of the legal, economic and institutional means and, finally, in the achievement of the institutional purposes that both the public and the political class want in the long run. An Economic Plan, due to its global, systemic, institutional and democratic nature, cannot be the product of the imposition of a sector of the population, especially when it has been exposed in the elections that the pro-government sector is in the minority and the parliamentary or democratic approval was no such thing, but a mere unilateral government imposition.

Following is a brief description of the present situation, then the substantivity of the Economic Plans in Venezuela since the late 50's with the birth of the Punto Fijo democracy, up to the 2019-2025 period, which, closing with the “Executive President” N. Maduro Moros, went through several presidential periods of H. Chávez F.

BASES OF ECONOMIC PLANNING: CONCEPT, OBJECT AND PURPOSE

The doctrine “considers democratic economic planning, another link between the republican and socialist tradition” (Rodriguez, 2020, p. 115). However, to get there it is necessary to go through an improper misrepresentation of the classic socialist political project. Otherwise, it would be almost impossible to reconcile it at the same time with the liberal paradigm. Nevertheless, the establishment of a form of democratic planning of the economy has the potential to fully consummate the emancipatory yearning that began with the vital French Revolution and which is materialized in the consolidation of rights for the entire population. Thus, Economic Planning appeared with two Republics: Germany and the USSR. In the first case, with a democratic political form, in the second with socialism, both in the twenties of the twentieth century.

In this sense, “one of the elements that characterizes the modern world is the separation established between the public or political sphere, in which one is a citizen, and the private sphere, in which one is only an individual” (Cappella, 1997, pp. 110-111) and which responds to a process of rationalization referable to any type of actions, since the attempt to achieve certain objectives leads to relate and also to link more or less isolated actions, whose realization thus responds to a line of action previously established in order to achieve those results. Line of action that implies the choice of a series of options among the possible ones to follow; specifically, those that are conceived as the most suitable to achieve those objectives. Prediction of behaviors: foreseen behaviors, behaviors calculated in accordance with the aims to be achieved, and that, while those to be followed are imposed, different ones are to a certain extent excluded. As it is argued

...planning always starts from the global and joint consideration of a given reality. In order to influence it and to achieve certain objectives, it establishes the behaviors to be followed, specifying also the means necessary for this purpose (Martín-Retortillo, 1991, p. 326).

That is, what does it pursue, how does it pursue it, with what means does it pursue it? Expressions that are underlined as those that allow to approach a possible categorization of the structural scheme to which the planning responds and, the concept of Plan, whose forecasts in any case are also forged during a determined time, that is, for how long is it pursued? The same author says (1991) “Basically, it is a way, an operative technique of acting” (Martín-Retortillo, 1991, p. 327). Any Plan can be established based on three extremes:

1. The determination and establishment of the objectives at the service of which the Plan is established, which are its justifying cause, its very own purpose. A design that highlights the instrumental nature of planning in the service of those objectives, always concrete, whose determination is basically a consequence of a political option.

2. The establishment of the objectives to be achieved naturally requires that the Plan also establishes the precise instrumentation for their achievement, that is to say, the congruence between the destination-means institutes the essential structure of any plan. Instrumentation that, in addition, imposes the creation of such means that must always be proposed from an empirical perspective, eminently realistic and operational, which implies analyzing the issue from a formal, material or subjective point of view with its respective feasibility.

3. The Plan must also foresee the actions to be carried out in order to achieve all its objectives. Establishment of the behaviors required for this purpose; behaviors that are instrumentally necessary for this purpose. A question that brings us face to face with the issue of the obligatory nature of the plans.

Specifically, the linkage and its types with respect to public and private, national and international behaviors, both of which concur in planning, are: 1) obligatory for the public sector; 2) indicative for the private sector; that is, mandatory for the former, just a possibility for the latter: (French style of economic planning). Even so, “that the Constitution makes it possible to reconcile planning with the market economy, establishing a double effect of economic plans” (Cosculluela, 2012, p. 210). Similarly, it is stated that “...it should be pointed out that economic plans in constitutional systems that establish the social market economy model cannot have a binding effect on the private sector” (Cosculluela, 2012, p. 210). (Cosculluela, 2012, p. 211). Although, it is a controversial opinion, since it would imply denying mandatory governmental action of the State in economic affairs, when the private sector from a constitutional point of view is positioned as a partner of the State in the achievement of government political programs.

Another important point to be highlighted is the determination of the ends to be achieved and the provision of the means required for this purpose. Moreover, there is a very special feature of the Economic Plans: their global nature as an overall approach to the reality they consider, and which also entails the systematic organization of a series of actions that attempt to tackle a reality as a whole from the perspective of its systematic and global organization. This is a legal principle of the Economic Plan, an approach that is inherent to Planning, insofar as the latter is the expression of a very clear and defined rationalization process. But, in turn, the systematizing rationality of the Economic Plan with future behaviors ends up configuring the Plan as a logical and rational process of foreseeing behaviors that is opposed to isolated and sporadic actions: the Principle of Certainty and the Principle of Systematicity of the Economic Plan, which in turn means a kind of legality capable of achieving a limitation to the legal-subjective sphere of the economic operator.

Yes, it is true, concreteness, certainty, the foreseeing of precise means and conduct to achieve express ends, are the structural characteristics of a Plan. However:

The Economic Plan also responds to a dynamic formation, from the consideration that planning offers as an authentic process: a technique of action of the different established public powers, which implies the localization of a certain dose of ius imperium, and of coercion, which, in one way or another, ends up imposing in the terms indicated, the actions that the Plan foresees (Martín-Retortillo, 1991, p. 331).

As a first approach, the doctrine includes the considerations formulated by Ernst Fortshoff from the point of view of the degree of intervention and commitment implied by the different types of Plans. First, the Plans where the different public authorities bind themselves without giving rise to any rights on the part of the persons under administration or directly and significantly affecting their status; second, the Plans that also internally regulate the State administrative action, although they do not directly and significantly affect their legal status; and third, the Plans that also discipline processes of State administrative action, but whose external effects already directly affect the legal status of the persons under administration: either by imposing certain behaviors on them, or by establishing the conditions for their provisions to become obligatory, or even, in some cases, by determining the extension and scope of their legal situations in terms that also legally transcend protectable assets, such as the National Economic Development Plans, industrial conversion, energy, urban development or hydraulic or forestry exploitation plans.

A last general consideration also deduced from the heterogeneous reality offered by planning, which must be pointed out:

Likewise, planning and plan - activity and instrument - are legally concurrent concepts; they are not, however, necessarily coincident. This is an observation that must be taken into account: if every plan, as a legal institute, always entails and establishes a certain planning, it can even be said that it is the most appropriate form through which it is carried out, the inverse proposition is not always true. It is planned through plans; not only, however, through them (Martín-Retortillo, 1991, p. 333).

In view of the above, it should be emphasized that the principle of the interchangeability of administrative techniques comes into play here: the objectives that planning postulates in each case can be achieved through very different techniques of action -not only through plans-: system of subsidies, concessions, authorizations, tax exemptions, expropriations, original and successive economic reserves, exemptions, exonerations, etc. Techniques that can also respond to a certain policy, which, however, is not always formalized through recourse to the institutional formula of the plans. In legal terms there is a real difficulty to codify the planning with unitary form: there are many figures that concur in it and through which it is updated.

HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF PLANNING IN VENEZUELA

The 1961 Constitution (first stage)

Economic planning has been an issue since the origins of the Venezuelan Democratic State, in 1958. In this sense:

Locating in 1958, the origin of Economic Planning -and with it the reform- in Venezuela is conventional. During the Gómez regime, different efforts were made for a planned administrative reform -even at the economic level-, but they were rather oriented towards the construction of a national administration. This was especially the case with the creation of the national public treasury. However, in 1958 begins the diagnosis of the state of the Venezuelan public administration, according to the configuration during the centralization process carried out by the Gómez regime (COPRE, 1990, p. 11 et seq.).

Indeed, 1958 was an important year since the “Report on the Improvement of Public Administration in Venezuela”, prepared under the auspices of the United Nations, was presented. Shortly thereafter, Decree No. 287 was issued, which created the Public Administration Commission. The basic approach, then, was to reform the State at all levels, including the economic level, in order to increase its efficiency, effectiveness and transparency (On this background, the Public Administration Commission (1972). Therefore, Economic Planning, in general, existed as a formal policy even prior to the 1961 Constitution. However, at the end of the 1960's, the conception of Planning would change as a result of the approach formulated by Brewer-Carías in 1968. It was no longer only a matter of increasing administrative efficiency and transparency. Thus, for the jurist Brewer-Carías (1968) “Planning as a means of reform should be placed in a much broader concept, namely, the necessary administrative modification as a result of the transformation of the Venezuelan State as a Social State” (Brewer-Carías, 1968, p. 42). At the same time, “the State had to adapt itself to an economic environment in such a way that the State's tasks would not replace private initiative in economic matters” (Brewer-Carías, 1968, p. 41). Finally, for Brewer-Carías “this change in the state paradigm through the Economic-Social Plan should then be linked to development, but as a development created by the State” (1968, p. 42). Therefore:

Development, therefore, is not and cannot be in our countries, a spontaneous process, but very much on the contrary, a provoked and directed process, a planned process (...) The State in our countries must be then, the agent of development, and not a secondary or minor agent, but quite the contrary... (Brewer-Carías, 1968, p. 43).

The above approach was assumed especially in the Economic Plan of President Rafael Caldera (1969-1974), as well as in the IV National Plan (1970-1974). According to the above vision, Economic Planning with the idea of development cannot be a consequence of the pure free development of the individual in society, but must be a process led, guided and planned by the State, all of which requires adapting the Public Administration to this “new” role of the State. This was even embodied in the RA-I Instruction of May 13, 1970, in which the President established the guidelines for Economic Planning based on the need to adapt the State to the public function of development. To this, what is called the statist vision of development, that is, the conception according to which economic development must be the consequence of a process planned from the State with a central character and supported by the broad intervention of the State.

The Report presented by the Public Administration Commission in 1972, then presided by Brewer-Carías, summarizes the vision as follows:

...the role of the State in the development process of Latin American countries and its progressive configuration as a Social State of Law, make its administration become the main strategic factor of this process due to its instrumental character. Public administration in our countries, therefore, being the main and most important instrument of State intervention, must be rethought in its conception and function in order to overcome the abstentionist schemes, which it has as an interference of that liberalism of the last century now overcome (Brewer-Carías, 1968).

Such a statist vision of economic development arose in the pseudo-interpretation given to the Social State as a State that assumes in a principal and preponderant way the conduction of the economic process, but with a temporary character. Simply as a means to achieve development under the premise that freely organized civil society could not, autonomously, achieve development. In such a way that the role of the State in economic planning and development was also a typical manifestation of the oil rent, since the State, being the owner of the soil and subsoil, also assumed the function of “distribution” of wealth. In short, the Social State, whose “new” and broad tasks justified the Economic Planning for the reform of the State, to better adapt it to this special configuration of the State. The conception of the Social State was assumed as a clear contrast to the so-called Liberal Bourgeois State, interpreted as an abstentionist State. As the jurist Brewer-Carías (1968) lucidly pointed out in his time:

However, in the face of that reality of the interventionist State, in the facts, it pretends to continue managing or shaping the economic reality with the schemes of the Liberal-Bourgeois State, that is to say, substantially, with the schemes of the Abstentionist State. Hence, the new tendencies to consider the State today, no longer as a Liberal-Bourgeois State of Law, but as a Social State of Law, and as the Anglo-Saxon doctrine that has been advocating the substitute notion of the Welfare State, the Benefactor State.

It is clear that if development is to be achieved through decisive and determined action by the State with an efficient public administration, capable of promoting, provoking and shaping the necessary social, economic and political changes, and that if the current administrative structures are designed for an abstentionist State, it is essential to begin by first making and provoking the necessary changes in the organization and structure of the State, apparatus par excellence of that development.[2]

In Volume II of the 1972 Report of the Public Administration Commission, an important process of diagnosis of the public administrations was carried out, even proposing several draft laws that in the following years resulted in laws that are still in force today. This Report was profound, rigorous, systematic and based on the institutionalization of a public-state function of removing obstacles that hinder the existence of material conditions of equality which, in turn, brought with it a statist vision of constitutional law, administrative law and, in short, law in general. This was also stamped when:

Administrative Law in this form, thus acquires a new perspective: it is a branch of public law whose object is the regulation of the organization, functioning and activity of a State, whose role is far from corresponding to an abstention, and on the contrary, it is essentially intervening, and, shaping economic and social life (Brewer-Carías, 1975, p. 116).

Economic planning gradually achieved a more statist vision of economic development in the period 1974-1979 with Carlos Andres Perez (CAP), as experts on the subject know, with the V National Plan, which, in addition, was greatly reinforced with the nationalization policies, which meant the rise of the rentier model. Manifestations of such a statist vision were the nationalization policies developed at the time, all of which increased the size of public administrations and, with it, the demands for their reform. Therefore, in short, “Venezuela can be characterized as a democratic State with an accentuated interventionist direction” (Brewer-Carías, 1980, p. 439) or “as an overcoming of the old Liberal-Bourgeois State, or Abstentionist” (Brewer-Carías, 1980, p. 440). Thus, the Reform had to adapt the Administration to this “new” configuration of the State. A vision that, in substance, was maintained in the following years, since, to begin with, the Government of Luis Herrera Campíns (1979-1984) with Decree No. 1,416 created the Public Administration Commission, where the great impulse given to regionalization and citizen participation, especially through the policy of citizen deconcentration, stands out. Notable is, of course, the enactment during this period of the current Organic Law of Administrative Procedures. The Decree repealed Decree No. 11, which had created the Ad-hoc Commission.

The 1961 Constitution (second stage)

In the 1980s, planning and development as a promoter of public administration reform acquired another context with the creation of the Commission for the Reform of the State (COPRE, for its initials in Spanish), pursuant to Decree No. 403. In general terms, COPRE oriented “the formulation of proposals -plans- for the establishment of a ‘modern, essentially democratic and efficient State’...” (1984) based on citizen participation. In such a way that the previous Decree N° 403 normatively subrogated the Decree that had created the Public Administration Commission, where at the same time it placed its proposal in two large blocks: 1) the political-territorial decentralization; and 2) the promotion of citizen participation, since the previous system reduced citizen participation in a mere participation through the political parties, as a funnel that contained the overwhelming citizen participation.

In this sense, COPRE proposed a new economic reform plan, which meant the total revision of the state functioning through a set of laws in 1989 that changed not only the dynamics of the administrative power, but of the national economy and that in general lines implied the most ambitious plan of modernization of the State in the 20th century. The first test in the economic area was the expected reestablishment of economic liberties, which implied a liberalization policy that modified the perception of the individual in society, since the development model was based on liberties.

In this sense, the reform of the Administration, between the 80s and 90s of the last century, was part of a larger process, hence the criticism of the centralized State model and the need to promote greater democratization in the administration itself, through the revision of its intervention techniques in the economy, decentralization and citizen participation, which resulted in the institutional weakening of the Administration of power.

The 1999 Constitution

It is important to point out that the concept of economic planning is inseparably linked to the concept of a country's development, to such an extent that there would be no harmonious economic development or reform without an authentic Economic Plan that regulates the government's program in the handling of the economy, in conjunction with market forces. Article 299 of the Constitution (1999) states:

The socioeconomic regime of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela is based on the principles of social justice, democracy, efficiency, free competition, environmental protection, productivity and solidarity, in order to ensure integral human development and a dignified and profitable existence for the community. The State, together with the private initiative, will promote the harmonic development of the national economy in order to generate sources of employment, high national added value, raise the standard of living of the population, and strengthen the country's economy, guaranteeing the legal security, solidity, dynamism, sustainability, permanence and equity of the growth of the economy, to achieve a fair distribution of wealth through a democratic, participative and open consultation strategic planning.

Although it is true that the previous norm does not mention the concept of state reform, the national Constitutions end up being the factor of establishment of the new programs by the new national leaders. As could be seen in the previous sections, the reforms initiated in 1984 did not stop the generalized criticisms of the Venezuelan State and its crisis. On the contrary, after the 1989 reforms that affected the Venezuelan presidential system of government -which was severely weakened- a political crisis was unleashed that led not only to the departure of President Perez, but also to the reformulation of the Venezuelan State as embodied in the 1961 Constitution. Thus, “1989 marks, then, a period of ‘crisis’ in the Venezuelan State: the popular revolts of 1989, the coup d'état attempts in 1992 and the impeachment-removal of the President in 1993 are signs of such crisis” (Caballero, 2007, p. 181).

This generated an atmosphere of generalized criticism of the State and its institutions, including the very conception of Venezuelan democracy based on the legal figure of the political party. It does not seem to have been foreseen that the drastic substitution of this model of the State posed a risk to the stability of the State itself and of the prevailing democratic system which, with all its criticisms, had allowed the consolidation of the Venezuelan democratic society. The solution conceived for such a terminal crisis, as it was denounced, was the announcement of a National Constituent Assembly (ANC-1999, for its initials in Spanish), who had openly defended such a solution, then ended up implementing it as Executive President in the 1998 elections, allowing the Constituent to move from debate to facts. A point that occupied then long discussions was whether the convening of the ANC could be called without the need to reform the 1961 Constitution. Thus:

President Chávez had already manifested himself favorably in this sense, and, according to two rulings -not very enlightening it must be said- a consultative referendum on the election of the ANC was called, which, in essence, implied the admission of the viability of such ANC without the need to reform the Constitution (Brewer-Carías, 1999, p. 151 and following).

In any case, the 1999 constituent process was marked by the need to drastically transform the State as indicated in Decree No. 3 of February 2, 1999 (Official Gazette No. 36.364), pursuant to which the election of the ANC was submitted to a consultative referendum:

The Venezuelan political system is in crisis and the institutions have suffered an accelerated process of delegitimization. Despite this reality, the beneficiaries of the regime, characterized by the exclusion of the great majorities, have permanently blocked the changes demanded by the people. As a consequence of this behavior, popular forces have been unleashed, which only find their democratic channel through the convocation of the original Constituent Power. Furthermore, the consolidation of the Rule of Law requires a legal basis that allows the practice of a social and participatory democracy.

As can be observed, the existence of a “terminal crisis” of the Venezuelan State was the ultimate basis for the 1999 constituent process which culminated in the 1999 Constitution, in which the Venezuelan State was “refounded” and the attempts of State reform and reform of the administration itself, initiated in the previous decades, were intended to come to an end. In fact, “the 1999 Constitution did not ‘refound’ the Venezuelan State, because, with some inconveniences, it limited itself to gather many of the conquests achieved in the previous decades” (Brewer-Carías, 2004, p. 818 et seq.). Therefore, “that Constitution contains notable advances for the administrative transformation, from a centralized, and, closed structure of power to an open and participatory structure” (Hernández, 2011. p. 125 et seq.). Thus:

First, the Constitution imposes the concept of a vicarious administration, which means that it must orient its activity to the service of the administered and to the full enjoyment of fundamental rights (art. 141); second, it imposes the concept of an administration governed by the political-citizen participation (arts. 2 and 62); third, it imposes the concept of a moderate administration (art. 300); in fourth place, it imposes the concept of an administration governed by objectivity and full subordination to the Law (art. 141); in fifth place, it imposes the concept of business subsidiarity to private economic initiative (art. 299); in sixth place, it applies the concept of decentralized public administration as a policy oriented to bring the exercise of power closer to the citizen and, therefore, as an instrument at the service of democracy, never against it. The above was associated in the last two Venezuelan homeland plans. In short:

The referenced constitutional system of economy, set by the 1999 Constitution, even with the imbalances that political practice has caused, was sought to be changed at the root in the proposed constitutional reform (2007), which was rejected by the people by referendum (Brewer-Carías, 2011, p. 87.).

In effect, it sought to radically change this model by accentuating the existing imbalance between the public and the private by transforming it into a totally state economy system, of centralized planning, typical of a socialist State and economy where economic freedom and the right to property would flee as constitutional rights and, with it, the very principle of legal reserve. In effect, article 112 of the Constitution establishes, as has been pointed out and as one of the fundamental principles of the constitutional system, the right of all persons to:

To be able to freely engage in the economic activity of their choice, without any limitations other than those provided for in this Constitution and those established by law, for reasons of human development, security, health, environmental protection or other reasons of social interest. The State shall promote private initiative, guaranteeing the creation and fair distribution of wealth, as well as the production of goods and services that satisfy the needs of the population, freedom of labor, enterprise, commerce and industry, without prejudice to its power to dictate measures to plan, rationalize and regulate the economy and promote the integral development of the country.

Statist Conception of Planning and Development in the Model of Transition to Socialism (2003-2012)

Between 1999 and 2002, efforts to reform the Administration in accordance with its constitutional configuration of vicarious Administration were observed, which even resulted in a novel conception that in the hydrocarbons, electricity and telecommunications sectors significantly nuanced the statist conception of development. As of 2003:

... this vision will change, as the State resumes traditional channels of intervention in the socio-economic order, which, on the basis of the statist vision of development predominant among us, led to a gradual growth of the bureaucratic apparatus of the Administration, especially when in 2003 price controls and exchange controls are deployed (Casal, 2011, p. 132).

An element that could have determined the change in public policies were the events of 2002: the increase in popular protests against President Chávez, the coup attempt and, at the end of the year, the beginning of a national strike that affected the functioning of basic economic sectors, such as the oil industry, all of them were elements that triggered the change that materialized in 2003, with the implementation, at the beginning of that year, of the price and exchange control. Subsequently, “an economic model based on greater administrative intervention began to develop, through some novel figures, such as those aimed at promoting endogenous development” (Obuchi, 2011, p. 20).

In 2005 these guidelines will be clearly qualified as transition to socialism. Despite the express qualification of socio-economic development as socialist, the National Executive did not give such expression a concrete content. Rather, it was insisted that such socialist model would be progressively assumed in accordance with its own realities. In practice, this model was externalized in the same measures adopted since 2003 based on the broad administrative intervention. In other words, the change was more nominal than substantive. However, gradually “it was affirmed that the socialist model, or the transition to socialism, should be based on the need to influence the relations of production, through the creation of mechanisms of co-management and collective appropriation of the means of production” (Hernández, 2008, p. 323), which in practice was externalized in the progressive extension of public enterprises, even with singular expropriations of private enterprises.

In this sense, the Administration assumed the creation of a new type of company called social production companies, which are basically companies based on the collective ownership of the means of production in accordance with the principle of co-management and self-management oriented to the achievement of social needs, an abstract concept assumed in opposition to profit-making exploitation. Thus, “These so-called enterprises (Social Production Enterprises) were in reality public enterprises that in practice operated as traditional mercantile companies” (Hernández, 2008, p. 7).

From 2007 onwards, the implementation of this model intensified. Through the policy of nationalization of different private companies and economic sectors managed by free private initiative, the State increased its participation in the economy. In some cases, nationalization took the form of the acquisition of private companies through agreements. In other cases, nationalization was the consequence of the expropriation of private companies. Finally, laws were enacted, which coercively embarked on the nationalization of entire sectors. This policy led to an increase in the number of state-owned companies, whose number also increased due to the original creation of public companies and joint ventures, which were in fact state-owned companies, since the state owns more than half of the capital stock. For this reason

...the implementation of the socialist model in practice meant a notable increase in the State as an entrepreneur, which, despite being based on the appearance of novel corporate forms, in reality, as we have seen, was expressed through the public enterprises as they are known in Venezuela (Hernández, 2008, p. 105 et seq.).

Another similar figure were the Missions, subjective figures in charge of the management of service activities, but in parallel to the organization of the Central National Public Administration, which at first had no legal basis, until 2010, when the new Organic Law of the Public Administration (LOAP, for its initials in Spanish) of that time enshrined its support in the Venezuelan reality and which, it must be said, have several legal forms. In this sense, “This organizational technique was inserted within centralism, which, in opposition to the decentralization policy, characterizes the socialist model from its social definition” Rachadell, 2007, p. 36 et seq.) and which relegates civil society in the political decision-making process at the local and community level.

By 2007, after the reelection of President Chávez in December 2006, the need to reform the 1999 Constitution arose. The causes invoked were different from 1998. It was no longer a matter of re-founding the State in view of its “terminal crisis”, but of transforming the 1999 Social and Democratic State of Law into a Socialist State. To this end, the National Assembly approved the Constitutional Reform project to the Constitution, which actually incorporated the principles of the socialist transition model. Now, the conception of development was assumed to be based on socialism and, therefore, the central management and planning from the State in view of the preponderance of “general interests” over individual interests. The constitutional reform proposal moved away from constitutional flexibility and, therefore, from its democratic talent in order to assume socialism as an exclusive and excluding model. In conclusion:

The statist vision of development was recognized and exacerbated: such development is the responsibility of the State, together with community, social and personal initiative," according to the proposed wording of article 299. In this project, individual initiative was absorbed into collective initiative (Morles, 2007, p. 137).

Particularly serious was the proposal to reform article 141 of the Constitution to abandon the concept of the vicarious Administration and replace it with an Administration at the service of the State. The worrying conclusion, in the words of many administrative experts, was the death of liberal Administrative Law in Venezuela, since the proposal sought to base the Administration on prerogative and power and not on the rights and guarantees of the administered -citizen-, which is paradoxical, given the drive of this reform to promote the democratization of the political and economic process. This reform project represented in a formal way the first economic-social and development plan of the Chavista era. And it was rejected by referendum on December 2, 2007, since it represented how the economy should be subordinated to the social interest, all of which implies the direction of this change from the State and, specifically, through the social economy enterprises and the missions.

Subsequently, the Decree-Laws (2008-2013) granted content, in various sectors, to that statist model of development, being able to cite the Organic Law of Agri-Food Security and Sovereignty. In such a way:

That the new socialist model has resulted in the strengthening of the statist conception of development, i.e., that development must be the main responsibility of the State, which, for this purpose, will seek the support of private initiative, reduced to the new subjective figures of the Social Production Enterprises (Alvarado, 2010, p. 377 et seq.).

At first glance, the aim is to replace one administrative and economic model with another. But the change is only nominal because in both cases the administration is the tool used by the State to carry out its tasks, which marks its dependence on changes within the State. This is why the attempt to modify the State in the socialist model has led to important changes in the Administration which are very contradictory, however, with some of the objectives stated in the conception of the “new” Venezuelan State. Thus, in theory, the Socialist State should be different from the traditional State by moving away from bureaucratic structures and by initiating the direct participation of all citizens, who through community organizations replace the State administrative organizations. Hence, the relevance given to the Popular Power and the instances of “self-government” such as the communes which were established since 2008 in an unconstitutional manner by violating the scheme of separation of powers provided for in Article 136 of the Constitution and its following articles.

However, reality shows the opposite. There is a weakening of the bureaucratic structures of the State, that is, of the Public Administration, which, in contrast, appears strengthened, through different intervention techniques and an increasingly growing organization whose distinctive notes can be summarized as follows:

· First, the administration is conceived as an instrument of the Socialist State, and hence the insistence on the creation of “new” figures such as the Social Production Enterprises and the missions, which do not replace the traditional structures.

· Second, the public administration has acted within the framework of the recent centralism, in which the States and municipalities have been weakened through a “new” conception of decentralization, now assumed as the transfer of competences directly to the communities organized as instances of the People's Power through the coordination of the Federal Council of Government.

· Third, the new figures created in the context of the centralism of the national power have strengthened the attributions of the Presidency of the Republic, weakening the separation of powers. This strengthening has been achieved, moreover, within the framework of a “new” evaluation of the principle of legality. In addition, with the help of constitutional jurisprudence, the scope of the legal reserve has been reduced, expanding the scope of the regulatory power.

· Fourth, the public administration has resorted to financing its intense service activity through special budgetary funds that weaken the basic principle of unity of the treasury and, therefore, weaken the applicable controls. The autonomy of the Central Bank of Venezuela was reduced, especially with respect to the management of international reserves and their surplus.

· Fifth, the loss of objectivity of the public administration and its continuous politicization outside the constitutional and legal provisions sanctioning the principle of objectivity.

· Finally, the Public Administration has assumed a total and global intervention based on the social functionalization of the citizen's general freedom. For this reason, spaces of the freely organized society have been reduced and occupied by subjective figures of the administration or figures that in practice are absorbed by the Administration.

THE PATRIA PLAN AS PDESN (2013-2025). ITS CONTENT AND NULL AND VOID CHARACTER

Constitutional Situation of the Plans

In Venezuela, the planning of the economic activity in general is a state competence that is carried out by means of a law. The Laws approving economic plans have a special channel in their elaboration -in principle administrative- and in their assembly processing. The Constitution, by means of Article 187, specifies what the objectives of this type of law should be, although it does not prescribe a specific content, even a minimum. In any case, it is understood that the administrative considerations regarding the Annual Budget Law apply to this type of laws, in the sense that the insertion of such laws approving global plans of the economy should not be considered admissible or they will not be adjusted to the purposes provided in article 299. And neither “can matters other than those provided in that same article be admitted, since also, the laws approving these plans have a special procedure expressly provided for in special laws” (Cosculluela, 2012, p. 211).

In this sense, the requirement of the law to carry out the planning of the general economic activity -whether or not, in the end, its translation into Social Production Enterprises- is a direct result of a constitutional rule. On other occasions, without there clearly being an analogous requirement, the same solution - approval by law of general economic planning - has also been used as the result of a simple constitutional praxis. The formal law is the means of implementation of the Economic Plan.

Its initiative corresponds to the Government: article 236.18 of the Constitution; the logical requirement of article 299 of the Constitution insofar as it explicitly states that the Government will be the one to draw up the planning projects. These terms are very similar to those usually used in relation to the preparation of the budget. Basically, the Economic Plan is a product of the Government. The adoption of options that represent purely political choices can only be adopted by the Government. It is therefore up to the Government to draw up the plan, just as it will also be responsible for its implementation. Hence, it is only the Government that can propose its approval to the National Assembly. Moreover, the Plan implies a series of political commitments projected in the economic sphere that only the Government should formulate in the exercise of the leadership that is incumbent upon it: article 236.1 of the Constitution. Apart from this -and this is a decisive reason-, in principle, only the Government has the data that the formulation of any plan requires.

The implementation of economic planning by means of a law is an endorsement of its democratic nature. However, the above statement should be qualified by taking into account the possible proceduralization that may arise from the assembly's action in the planning process. This is a complex issue that calls for several clarifications. This is called: the democratic principle of the economic plan. The assembly intervention, logical and necessary, cannot be said to be even moderately satisfied with the simple knowledge and approval of the Plan that it can carry out. It is necessary, as J. Meynaud said:

That it can know and pronounce itself seriously on the content of the Plan. Only in such a case, it can be deduced that he assumes and rectifies the options that it presents, and effectively pronounce himself on its content. This is not easy to achieve, and is conditioned by two very specific circumstances (Meynaud, 1962, p. 98).

In the first place, due to the complexity of the economic plan, the options that it can present are really multiple and the solutions that can be assumed in accordance with them are also interconnected. The Plan forms a whole: a system. It is difficult to modify it singularly in some specific points without this not having an impact on the whole that it represents. How to propose rectifications to a Plan? The legal system implicitly institutes the mechanism: with legislative reform. Comparative Law recognizes the above guiding legal principle.

Secondly, added to these circumstances is the irrefutable fact that the procedural actions of the various congresses continue to be heavily influenced by the usual procedures for exercising regulatory functions. It cannot be said that, despite ongoing attempts, even moderately satisfactory results have been achieved in formalizing the control techniques to be exercised by the assembly bodies, particularly in the economic sphere. This is the legal principle of control of government management by the legislative branch in economic matters. In this case, the Plan is attached as an annex to the Law signed by the Assembly. Comparative law also recognizes the aforementioned principle.

Curiously, Venezuela has had only three plans in the last 24 years. One connected with the Constitutional Reform (2007), another connected with Nicolás Maduro M. (2013-2019), and another also connected with Nicolás Maduro M. (2019-2025). All three were presented consecutively since 2007. From 1999 to 2006, there was no Government Plan. Strangely, it was with the intention of establishing socialism that the idea of implementing a specific Economic Plan in Venezuela emerged. The first was rejected in 2007. The others were unconstitutionally approved in different ways in 2013 and 2019, respectively.

That is why “The Patria Plan or the ‘Third Socialist Plan for Economic and Social Development of the Nation of Venezuela’ is a medium-term plan for the period 2019-2025 that contains general guidelines for its implementation” (CEPAL, 2020, p. 1); as should be the case with economic plans based on the principle of globality and which have a temporary validity in line with the presidential term. Obviously, it goes without saying that the National Constituent Assembly (ANC, 2017-2021, which approved the Third Socialist Plan for Economic and Social Development of the Nation) was unconstitutionally convened, helping to form a fundamental idea about the constituent assembly, which, after four years, never fulfilled its only constitutional function: to approve a new constitution. Today, the National Constituent Assembly expired three and a half years ago. On the contrary, the ANC-2017-2021 was used to sanction the category of constitutional laws that have no parallel in the legal system to receive Accountability Reports from Ministers and other high-ranking officials, including for the sanctioning of the law approving the PDESN. In all these cases, the ANC committed the crime of usurpation of functions. Thus, Article 138 of the Constitution establishes that: “Any usurped authority is ineffective and its acts are null and void.” Based on the above, the PDESN is not enforceable and no executive act can be based on the Plan.

Contents of the Plans

Now, all 2007-2013, 2013-2019, and 2019-2023 Patria Plans have the following guidelines:

1. To defend, expand, and consolidate the most precious asset we have regained after 200 years: national independence.

2. To continue building 21st-century Bolivarian socialism in Venezuela as an alternative to the “destructive and savage system of capitalism” and thereby ensure “the greatest possible happiness, the greatest social security, and the greatest political stability for our people.”

3. To turn Venezuela into a social, economic, and political powerhouse within the emerging great power of Latin America and the Caribbean, guaranteeing the creation of a zone of peace in Our America.

4. To contribute to the development of a new international geopolitics, in which a multicentric and pluripolar world takes shape, allowing for the achievement of balance in the universe and guaranteeing planetary peace.

5. Contribute to the preservation of planetary life and the salvation of the human species.

In addition, the two documents set out a total of 32 national objectives, 173 strategic objectives, 731 general objectives, and 1,859 specific objectives. This is enough to conceive at first glance that the Patria Plans are difficult to implement administratively by the national executive, state executive powers, and municipal executive powers.

It is important to note that, at first glance, these are more political-governmental programs that tend to use metaphysics as an ideological discourse in the social control of individuals. The First, Second, and Third Socialist Plans or Patria Plans 2007-2013, 2013-2019, and 2019-2025 are clear heirs to the old Simón Bolívar Plan, at least in terms of culture and the media. This conclusion was clearly identified from a comparison of the plans.

The Simón Bolívar Plan 2007-2013 contained the roadmap for what the state wanted to do with the media. The communicative state began to be built in 2003, and 2006 was the moment when the concept of communicative hegemony was launched. The government, both in its governing plan and in its actions, with the excuse of maintaining the power of the media as builders of subjectivity under the power of social forces, proceeded on the one hand to increase the state's communicative power and, on the other, to weaken the power of the private sector. Thus, the public sector grew while the private sector's influence in society declined. In this way, the Plans sought to generate a regressive effect on economic development through administrative planning that stifled individual freedoms.

It must be understood that the 1999 Constitution presents civil liberties and freedom of expression as institutional guarantees of the democratic system. Therefore, the mere placement of content of a certain bias in the official media, plus the political-governmental program, generates a noticeable imbalance or clear imbalance in the information communicated by the State, as it would seem that the only existing view is that the economy managed by the private sector is bad or that the media operating with private capital seek communicational hegemony, an argument that seeks to counterbalance the Schmittian prevalence of one political, economic, or communicational power over another in an all-or-nothing situation that shows little respect for the value of tolerance.

After all, freedom of expression is a “cornerstone of the very existence of a democratic society” (IACHR, 1985) and as such is a right composed of two distinct dimensions: the first is the individual dimension, which revolves around the subject entitled to the right based on their expectation of disseminating information, thoughts, ideas, and opinions, and the second is the social dimension, which focuses on the right of the community to receive that information, thoughts, ideas, and opinions (IACHR, 1985). Therefore, a direct or indirect restriction of the individual dimension of freedom of expression would, to the same extent, represent an infringement of the collective expectation to receive diverse points of view. The dimension of freedom of expression that is most closely related to the plurality of ideas is the social dimension, since in this dimension the essential expectation corresponds to the possibility of finding a diversity of information, expressions, and opinions in the public sphere. However, this should not lead us to forget the fact that both the expression and dissemination of thoughts and ideas are indivisible, as the Inter-American Court has held; therefore, a restriction on dissemination will directly and equally represent a violation of the law (IACHR, 1985).

All of this arises through critical, reflective, and dialogical analysis with the State-Communicator and the communicational hegemony that has been proposed to be established in the country (Bisbal, 2009, p. 21). In present-day Venezuela, the current government (referring to Chávez), which proclaims itself to be left-wing, is making a great effort to reset the minds of Venezuelans, and to this end, mass communication and its cultural industries must play a strategic role. This narrative, which has been promoted from the pinnacle of power using all the mechanisms of mass communication and culture, including those of culture in general, reintroduces an anti-historical density of relations between culture and society (IACHR, 1985) Bisbal, 2009, p. 13).

In addition, these plans allowed unorganized communities to build alternative media under the predetermined guidelines of the central state. The Second Socialist Plan is the successor to the hypodermic logic of the Simón Bolívar Plan of the 1990s, according to several experts in Venezuelan sociology, in which the media are the great potter's wheel where the collective imagination of the masses is molded—without opposition—to the will of those who own the media, that is, the state, since as Gramsci states, hegemony, in general terms, consists in the capacity of a particular social group for political, spiritual, and moral leadership. But this idea should not be understood only in formal political terms, but rather as a cultural issue, since it involves the imposition of a worldview (Mariscal, 2005, p. 3). It is pure proselytism, which seeks only to replace values rooted in society with those of “21st-century socialism,” something that not even Hugo Chávez himself managed to conceptualize (Boyd, 2013).

If in the period 2007-2013 it was accepted that because the owners of the media were individuals with an individualistic mindset, they undermined the idea that the common good could be achieved in society, in the period 2013-2019 it seems to be subtly accepted that this battle was won by the state, which took hegemonic control of a large part of the media spectrum in the country, proceeding to emancipate Venezuelan collectives and build socialist happiness. In the Second Socialist Plan, the potter's wheel with which the essence of the human being is molded is in the hands of the state, and the people who currently hold that power in society are overly generous in pointing out the objectives they seek with such power, and therein lies the problem. Prisoners of their own ideology, which is nothing more than ideas petrified in time, with little metabolic connection to reality, the objectives of the government's plan are closer to the metaphysical and the world of ideas than to plans, figures, and empirical facts to be measured with various scientific methods of a quantitative, qualitative, and observational methods, since it proposes everything from envisioning an education that suppresses men's selfish impulses toward the pursuit of their own well-being to the eradication of the self-destructive impulses of the international economy's productive system, vindicating an evanescent indigenous culture of “Our America.” All this involves the use of such subjective terms as being a world power, expanding independence, guaranteeing world peace, and ensuring the survival of the human species. These are all porous terms, so intangible that solid policies cannot be crystallized through such vague postulates. Therefore, it is difficult to deduce what policies it wants to design for the next five years and, with that, what techniques it will use.

CONCLUSIONS

First. From the present documentary research, it was possible to deduce a clear, varied, and differentiated way of formulating the Nation's Economic and Social Development Plans that respond to two perfectly distinct constitutional moments: the pre-constitutional period prior to 1999 and the post-constitutional period after 1999. In any case and in the scope of the different plans, whether economic or administrative, certain points of connection could be detected, such as those specified in the plans of the 1990s, where it was possible to find some degree of agreement on how to formulate, implement, and monitor public policies that revolve around the ideas of the administrative-economic plans that are implemented as part of the government's agenda.

Second. Originally, planning was oriented toward administrative governance, or the good administration of the state in any of its areas, in terms of its affairs with those it administered. Then, due to the economic crisis that arose in the early 1980s on Black Friday, development plans were put on the back burner to focus on the proper management of the nation's economic affairs. Finally, due to the political crisis of April 2002, a more ideological plan based on the idea of socialism was needed to increase the expansive power of the state and its interference in the minimum living space of those it administered. But there is one important aspect that must be made quite clear: these pre-constitutional plans knew how to create a policy based on clear goals.

Third. The Economic Plans of the Nation were not constitutionally approved and therefore do not have the necessary legitimacy or acceptance by civil society. This will generate resistance among economic operators, parties, and individuals, as they will not identify with the economic government's guidelines. In a democracy, all government measures must be discussed in the appropriate forums.

Fourth. Currently, the Economic Plans are unclear about what they want to develop as policy. At best, it could be said that they will continue what was built on the basis of the previous plan: more state-owned media, more ideologized education, more political propaganda in international cooperation, more reviews of plans for the geopolitical relocation of the population in the country, and, of course, more use of state resources to promote international television stations, radio stations, and newspapers in line with the interests of the financing states.

Fifth. There are few tangible objectives, even in the smallest and most specific sub-objectives in the Plan. Everything is more of an ideological spirit of what is to be done. Rather than a government plan for planning and evaluating government management, it is more of an exhibition of the spirit with which the government wants to be guided between 2013 and 2025. Tangible goals are difficult to find in the nearly 200 pages of content. What can be expected from the government for the next six years, from 2025 to 2031? The Patria Plan does not specify the different techniques of economic governance, such as nationalizations, expropriations, or privatizations. Constitutionally, the state is supposed to have a range of legal options to achieve different political and economic objectives, but these are not reflected in the plan. For example, it does not say how to lower inflation. Furthermore, if these techniques were to appear, a plan must specify the procedural channels to be followed to articulate these economic governance techniques in accordance with the general lines of the plan, but this does not appear either. The Patria Plan is written as an ideology, not with the aim of solving the nation's important economic problems. It seems that its objective is something other than providing quality goods and services. More metaphysics and less tangibility and evaluation are expected in the development of policies for the work and promotion of Venezuelan culture and its relationship with other nations:

The Patria Plan 2019-2025 is a phase of deepening the 2012-2018 stage. The five historical objectives have been maintained, developing and detailing them to the level of specific objectives, to the extent that the conditions of the revolution's development have required, in order to deepen the socialist direction. (MPPRE, 2019, p.1).

Sixth. The Patria Plans have honed a particular objective that emerged at the time of the call for a change in the world's ecological policies, for the sole purpose of aligning with the 2030 agenda, which seeks to prevent global warming caused by greenhouse gases and to promote industrialization that is more in line with less polluting carbon dioxide emissions from energy companies; it seeks international legitimacy. Raul Prebisch (1979) once stated:

...To put it simply, the facts have shown us that without transforming the system, planning makes very little sense in a consumer society where the interplay of power relations tends to lead to a crisis in the system. Planning alone cannot prevent this. There is no technical way to transform the system. The path is essentially political, and enormous obstacles will have to be overcome in order to follow it.

The author argues that liberal and socialist ideology do not contribute to solving the economic problem because the problem is the political exercise of power that does not respect the most basic legal and economic principles. It is not possible to plan in the midst of economic turmoil and social disintegration, he says; what is needed is a change in political culture that is then capable of producing a spark of energy in production.

REFERENCES

Alvarado, Jesús María (2010). La Constitución Económica y el Sistema Económico Comunal [The Economic Constitution and the Communal Economic System]. In Leyes Orgánicas sobre el Poder Popular y el Estado Comunal [Organic Laws on Popular Power and the Communal State]. Editorial Jurídica Venezolana. Caracas D.F., Venezuela.

Bisbal, Marcelo (2009). Hegemonía y Control Comunicacional [Hegemony and Communicational Control]. Alfa-Ucab. Caracas, Venezuela.

Boyd, Alek. (September 30, 2013). La Hegemonía Comunicacional del Chavismo [The Communicational Hegemony of Chavismo]. El País, Madrid. https://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2013/09/30/actualidad/1380550503_512747.html

Brewer-Carías, Allan Randolph (1968). Las Transformaciones de la Administración Pública para el Desarrollo [Transformations of Public Administration for Development]. Revista de la Facultad de Derecho, 41.

Brewer-Carías, Allan Randolph (1970). Reforma Administrativa y Desarrollo Económico-Social en Venezuela [Administrative Reform and Socio-Economic Development in Venezuela]. COPRE. Caracas D.F., Venezuela.

Brewer-Carías, Allan Randolph (1970). Una Revolución para el Desarrollo [A Revolution for Development]. Cuadernos para la Reforma Administrativa. Caracas, D.F., Venezuela.

Brewer-Carías, Allan Randolph (1975). Cambio político y Reforma del Estado en Venezuela [Political Change and State Reform in Venezuela]. Tecnos. Madrid, Spain.

Brewer-Carías, Allan Randolph (1980). Estudios sobre la Reforma Administrativa [Studies on Administrative Reform]. Universidad Central de Venezuela (UCV). Caracas D.F., Venezuela.

Brewer-Carías, Allan Randolph (1999). Asamblea Nacional Constituyente y Ordenamiento Constitucional [National Constituent Assembly and Constitutional Order]. Academia de Ciencias Políticas y Sociales. Caracas, Venezuela.

Brewer-Carías, Allan Randolph (2004). La Constitución de 1999. Derecho Constitucional Venezolano. Tomo II [The 1999 Constitution. Venezuelan Constitutional Law, Vol. II]. Editorial Jurídica Venezolana. Caracas D.F., Venezuela.

Brewer-Carías, Allan Randolph (2008). Estudio sobre la Propuesta Presidencial de Reforma Constitucional para la Creación de un Estado Socialista, Centralizado y Militarista en Venezuela (Análisis del Ante-Proyecto Presidencial, agosto 2007), [Study on the Presidential Proposal for Constitutional Reform to Create a Socialist, Centralized, and Militarized State in Venezuela (Analysis of the Presidential Draft, August 2007)]. In Anuario da Faculdade de Direito da Universidade da Coruña, Revista Jurídica Interdisciplinaria Internacional. La Coruña, Spain.12, 87–125.

Brewer-Carías, Allan Randolph (2011). La Constitución de 1999 y la Enmienda Constitucional N° 1 de 2009, [The 1999 Constitution and Constitutional Amendment No. 1 of 2009]. Editorial Jurídica Venezolana. Caracas D.F., Venezuela.

Caballero, Manuel (2007). La Crisis de la Venezuela Contemporánea (1903-1992), [The Crisis of Contemporary Venezuela (1903–1992)]. Editorial Alfa. Caracas, Venezuela.

Capella, Juan Ramón (1997). Fruta Prohibida: Una Aproximación Histórico-Teórica al Estudio del Derecho y del Estado, [Forbidden Fruit: A Historical-Theoretical Approach to the Study of Law and the State]. Trotta. Madrid, Spain.

Casal, Jesús María. (2011). La Libertad Económica en Venezuela, [Economic Freedom in Venezuela]. In Balance de una Década 1999-2009 [Balance of a Decade 1999–2009]. UCAB. Caracas, Venezuela.

CEPAL. (2020). Observatorio Regional de Planificación para el Desarrollo, [Regional Observatory for Development Planning]. https://observatorioplanificacion.cepal.org/es/planes/plan-de-la-patria-2019-2025-de-venezuela

Comisión de Administración Pública. (1972). La Reforma Administrativa para el Desarrollo, [Administrative Reform for Development]. In Informe sobre la Reforma de la Administración Pública Nacional, Tomo 1 [Report on the Reform of the National Public Administration, Vol. I]. p 3.

Comisión de la Administración Pública. (1972). Informe sobre la reforma de la administración pública nacional. Tomo I, [Report on the Reform of the National Public Administration, Vol. I].

Comisión de la Administración Pública. (1972). Informe sobre la reforma de la administración pública nacional. Tomo II, [Report on the Reform of the National Public Administration, Vol. II].

COPRE. (1990). Antecedentes de la Reforma del Estado [Background of State Reform]. Caracas, Venezuela.

Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos. (1985). Opinión consultiva OC-5/85, La colegiación obligatoria de periodistas (arts. 13 y 29 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos), [Advisory Opinion OC-5/85, Mandatory Registration of Journalists (arts. 13 and 29 of the American Convention on Human Rights)]. San José, Costa Rica.

Cosculluela, Luis (2012). Derecho Público Económico, [Economic Public Law], (4th ed.) Iustel. Madrid, Spain.

Gaceta Oficial. (1958). No. 25,694, June 27, 1958. Decreto No. 287 que creó la Comisión de la Administración Pública, [Decree No. 287 that created the Public Administration Commission].

Gaceta Oficial. (1970). 1399 Extraordinary No., May 13, 1970. Instrucción RA-I de 13 de mayo de 1970, [Instruction RA-I, (May 13, 1970)].

Gaceta Oficial. (1982). No. 32,450, April 7, 1982. Crea Comisión de Administración Pública, [Creates Public Administration Commission].

Gaceta Oficial. (1984). No. 33,127, December 17, 1984. Decreto No. 403 de creación de la Comisión para la Reforma del Estado (COPRE), [Decree No. 403 creating the Commission for State Reform (COPRE)].

Gaceta Oficial. (1999). No. 36,364, February 2, 1999. Decreto No. 3 por medio de la cual se sometió a referendo consultivo la elección de la ANC, [Decree No. 3 by which the election of the National Constituent Assembly (ANC) was submitted to consultative referendum].

Gaceta Oficial. (2000). No. 5,453 Extraordinary, March 24, 2000. Constitución de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela, [Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela].

Gaceta Oficial. (2010). No. 6,110 Extraordinary, December 21, 2010. Decreto-Ley Orgánico de Planificación Pública y Popular (DLOPPP), [Organic Decree-Law of Public and Popular Planning (DLOPPP)].

Gaceta Oficial de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela. (2013). Tercer Plan Socialista de Desarrollo Económico y Social de la Nación 2013-2019. Segundo Plan de la Patria (2019-2025), [Third Socialist Plan for Economic and Social Development of the Nation 2013-2019. Second Patria Plan (2019-2025)]. https://faolex.fao.org/docs/pdf/ven130206.pdf

Gaceta Oficial de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela. (2013). Tercer Plan Socialista de Desarrollo Económico y Social de la Nación 2013–2019, [Third Socialist Plan for Economic and Social Development of the Nation 2013–2019]. https://mppp.gob.ve/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/DESPLEGABLE-PLAN-PATRIA-2019-2025.pdf

Gaceta Oficial Extraordinaria. (2013). No. 6,118, December 4, 2013. Plan de la Patria (2013–2019) aprobado por una Ley de Asamblea Nacional, [Patria Plan (2013–2019) approved by a National Assembly Law].

Gaceta Oficial Extraordinaria. (2019). No. 6,442, April 3, 2019. Plan de la Patria (2019–2025) aprobado por una Ley Constituyente de la Asamblea Nacional Constituyente (ANC-2017–2020), [Patria Plan (2019–2025) approved by a Constituent Law of the National Constituent Assembly (ANC-2017–2020)].

Hernández, José Ignacio (2008). Reflexiones sobre la Constitución Económica y el Modelo Socio-Económico en Venezuela, [Reflections on the Economic Constitution and the Socio-Economic Model in Venezuela]. FUNEDA. Caracas, D.F., Venezuela.

Hernández, José Ignacio. (2008). Regulación Económica y Derecho Mercantil Venezolano a Comienzos del Siglo XXI, [Economic Regulation and Venezuelan Commercial Law at the Beginning of the 21st Century]. Foro de Derecho Mercantil, 21.

Hernández, José Ignacio (2011). Introducción al Concepto Constitucional de Administración Pública en Venezuela, [Introduction to the Constitutional Concept of Public Administration in Venezuela]. Cuadernos de Cátedra Allan R. Brewer-Carías, 27.

Mariscal, José Luis (2005). La Construcción de la Hegemonía en la Definición del Valor en el Arte Popular, [The Construction of Hegemony in Defining Value in Folk Art]. Gestión Cultural, 12. Portal Iberoamericano de Gestión Cultural: Mexico.

Martín-Retortillo, Sesbastián (1991). Derecho Administrativo Económico. Tomo I, [Economic Administrative Law. Vol. I]. La Ley. Spain.

Meynaud, Jean (1962). La Elaboración de la Política Económica, [The Making of Economic Policy]. Tecnos S.A. Spain.

Morles, Alfredo (2007). El Nuevo Modelo Económico para el Socialismo del Siglo XXI, [The New Economic Model for 21st Century Socialism]. Revista de Derecho Público, 112. Editorial Jurídica Venezolana. Caracas, D.F., Venezuela.

Obuchi, Richard. (2011). Gestión en Rojo [Management in Red]. Ediciones EESA. Caracas, D.F.,Venezuela.

Oficina Central de Coordinación y Planificación. (1970). V Plan de la Nación (1970–1974): el desarrollo social y cultural, [Fifth National Development Plan (1970–1974): Social and Cultural Development].

Plan Económico del Presidente Rafael Caldera, Presidencia de la República. (1969–1974), [Economic Plan of President Rafael Caldera].

Prebisch, Raúl. (1979). Planificación, Desarrollo y Democracia. Escenarios Alternativos, [Planning, Development and Democracy. Alternative Scenarios]. https://biblioteca.clacso.edu.ar/clacso/otros/20130531033526/prebisch.pdf

Rachadell, Manuel (2007). Socialismo del Siglo XXI [21st Century Socialism]. FUNEDA. Caracas, D.F., Venezuela.

Rodríguez, Jesús (2020). Renta Básica, Derechos y Planificación Económica. Esbozo para una Discusión Republicana, [Basic Income, Rights and Economic Planning. Outline for a Republican Discussion]. Revista Internacional de Pensamiento Político I Época, 15, pp. 109–119.

SITEAL. (2013). Segundo Plan Socialista de Desarrollo Económico y Social de la Nación 2013–2019. Primer Plan de la Patria (2013–2019), [Second Socialist Plan for Economic and Social Development of the Nation 2013–2019. First Patria Plan (2013–2019)]. https://siteal.iiep.unesco.org/sites/default/files/sit_accion_files/plan_de_la_patria._segundo_plan_de_desarrollo_economico_y_social_de_la_nacion_2013-2019.pdf

Notes

[1] Emphasis added by the author.
[2] This paraphrased idea appears in several works by Brewer-Carías, but is taken from: (1970) “Una Revolución para el Desarrollo” Cuadernos para la Reforma Administrativa. Caracas D.F. Venezuela, and (1970) “Reforma Administrativa y Desarrollo Económico-Social en Venezuela” COPRE. Caracas D.F., Venezuela.

Información adicional

redalyc-journal-id: 7752



Buscar:
Ir a la Página
IR
Visor de artículos científicos generados a partir de XML-JATS por